Reading VI � Mill utilitarianism - Justice

society is right ordered (and therefore just) when its major institutions are so arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it

Utilitarianism � from one man to an aggregate

each man, in realising his own interests, is certainly free to balance his own losses against his own gains

we may impose a sacrifice on ourselves now for the sake of a greater advantage later

a person acts to achieve his greatest good / advance his rational ends as far as possible

now why should not society act on precisely the same principle applied to the group, and therefore regard that which is rational for one man as right for an association of men?

just as the well-being of a person is constructed from the series of satisfactions which are experienced at different moments in time and which constitute the life of the individual, so the well-being of a society is to be constructed from the fulfilment of the systems of desires of the many individuals who belong to it

just as an individual balances present and future gains against present and future losses, so a society may balance satisfactions and dissatisfactions between different individuals

thus the principle for society is to advance as far as possible the welfare of the group, to realise to the greatest extend the comprehensive system of desire arrived at from the desires of its members

a society is properly arranged when its institutions maximise the net balance of satisfaction

the principle of choice for an association of men is interpreted as an extension of the principle of choice for one man

social justice is the principle of rational prudence applied to an aggregative of the welfare of the group

2 main concepts of ethics

the right + the good �/span> the concept of the morally worth person

structure of an ethical theory: how it defines/connects the right + the good

Teleological theories

the good is defined independently from the right

the right = that which maximises the good

teleological theories: intuitive appeal, seem to embody the idea of rationality, by maximising something

but: the good is defined independently from the right

1. equates value with the intuited good, so right is just maximising this good

2. can judge the goodness of things without referring to what is right

e.g. if pleasure is the sole good, then pleasures can be recognised + ranked in value by criteria that do not presuppose any standards of right

whereas: if the distribution of goods is also counted as a good (perhaps a higher order one), then produce the most good (including the good of distribution among others)

but then: no longer a teleological view in the classical sense

since the problem of distribution is one of right, so the theory lacks an independent definition of the good

teleological doctrines different according to conceptions of the good:

perfectionism = the realisation of human excellence in the various forms of culture (Aristotle, Nietzsche etc.)

hedonism = pleasure

eudaimonism = happiness

utilitarianism = the satisfaction of (rational) desire

Utilitarianism

it does not matter how the (maximised) sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals

(any more than it matters how one man distributes his satisfactions over time)

the correct distribution is always that which yields the maximum fulfilment

in itself, no distribution of satisfaction is better than another

common sense precepts of justice (e.g. the protection of liberties + rights, or the claims of desert) seem to contradict this

utilitarian explanation: experience shows that these should only be departed from in exceptional circumstances if the sum of advantages is to be maximised

common sense precepts of justice is useful in limiting men�s propensities to injustice and to socially injurious actions

but it is not a first principle of morals

there is no reason in principle why the violation of a liberty of a few might not be made right by the greater good shared by many

the most natural way of arriving at utilitarianism, then, is:

to adopt for society as a whole the principle of rational choice for one man

the place of the impartial spectator:

the spectator is conceived as carrying out the required organisation of the desires of all persons into one coherent system of desire

the emphasis on sympathy:

endowed with ideal powers of sympathy + imagination, the impartial spectator is the perfectly rational individual who identifies with and experiences the desires of others as if his own, and assigns them appropriate weight

the ideal legislator:

tries to maximise satisfaction by adjusting the rules of the social system

separate individuals as different lines along which right + duties are to be assigned, and scarce means of satisfaction allocated in accordance with rules to give the greatest fulfilment of wants

just as an entrepreneur decides how to maximise profit by producing this or that commodity

or a consumer decides how to maximise satisfaction by purchasing this or that collection of goods

single person: whose system of desires determines the best allocation of limited means

utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons

Notes

�impartial spectator�???

original position (� social contract)

Crisp � Mill on Utilitarianism, ch 7 pp 155

Modern version of the sheriff case

terrorist bombing, funding for the Bomb Squad will be cut if they don�t make an arrest

reasonable belief, that happens to be true, that the bomber will be caught within a week, but only if funding continues

(unjust) emergency law

Jean has exposed the Squad�s methods to the press

arrests her

promises to respect her legal rights, but doesn�t

charges her, judge convicts her because she is black

funding continues, catch the real bombers, but Jean stays in prison

The problem

act utilitarianism appears to exonerate the Chief Constable

and, in fact, to require them to act as they do

even though it all seems very unjust

Mill: debunking argument � introduction

there exists a strong �sentiment� of moral outrage

but: it�s not a �revelation of some objective reality�

but rather an animal or emotive (educatable) response

not a response to some genuine principle in conflict with utilitarianism

Mill: 6 spheres of justice

1. legal rights

2. moral rights

3. desert

not getting what you have earned, good or evil

4. contracts

breaking faith or disappointing expectations voluntarily engendered

5. impartiality

influenced by irrelevant considerations, e.g. race or sex

6. equality

e.g. communists, think that goods should be distributed according to need

equal needs give rise to equal claims to goods

the only relevant consideration in distribution is need � all other considerations are partiality + injustice

Mill: The link between spheres of justice

etymology of justice:

violation of actual law

then the sentiment of justice came to be attached to laws that ought to exist

we now wish that all injustice, even though not illegal, deserves public moral disapproval

Mill: Obligations

idea of punishment lies behind obligations of justice, but also moral obligation in general

difference between justice + rest of morality?

perfect vs imperfect obligations

perfect obligation = some other person has a correlative right

whereas: no one has a right to my charity (imperfect obligation)

injustice always involves:

a wrong done

some assignable person who is wronged

justice:

something right to do

and wrong not to do

and which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right

Mill: Justice within utilitarianism

can this sentiment of justice be made consistent with utilitarianism?

2 elements in the idea of justice:

a belief that some particular individual has been harmed

desire to punish the person who caused the harm

2 origins of the desire to punish:

natural self-defence impulse

feeling of sympathy (widest + most sophisticated in human beings)

just people resent only harms �of the kind which society has a common interest with them in the repression of�

the sentiment of justice is aroused against those who disobey the rules of customary morality (grounded on the promotion of utility), which protect the rights of individuals

right = �valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law or by that of education + opinion�

why should society protect individuals? general utility

the fact that justice has such a strong (supervenient/separate-seeming) sentiment attached is due to its animal origin and connection with security (an essential source of utility)

the rules of justice: protect �the very groundwork of our existence�

Mill: Justice is not an independent moral standard

ambiguity of the deliverances of our sense of justice

different individuals have varying views of what is just in particular areas

the same person can have conflicting principles of justice

e.g. punishment

only for the good of the punished?

only to deter other potential wrong-doers

we don�t have free will, so no one should be punished

each �builds upon rules of justice confessedly true�, e.g.

unjust to sacrifice a person for the sake of others

self-defence is justified

no one should be punished for what he cannot help

similar intractable disagreements in apportioning punishments to particular offences, and in reward for labour, taxation etc.

the principles of justice are among the secondary principles

and conflicts between them are decided as for any conflict between secondary principles:

social utility alone can decide the preference

Mill: The importance to welfare of the rules of justice

without the rules of justice, each would see everyone else as an enemy

justice is connected with desert (punishment) � evil for evil

good for good is connected with infliction of harm � breach of faith

the more specific principles are merely instrumental to the satisfaction of those principles already discussed

Mill: Conclusion

none of the general principles of justice are absolute

rights are not �trumps� over the demands of utility (Dworkin, 1984)

one should not steal, but there may particular cases in which stealing is justified

justice is not a stumbling-block for utilitarianism

Mill believes he has defused the problem of justice:

we can understand why we feel so strongly about it once we recognise its natural origins as a device for protecting important interetss

since these interests are so important, utilitarianism itself recommends that we continue speaking of justice + injustice, even though such talk is merely instrumental to the maximisation of welfare overall

Brink � Mill�s Deliberative Utilitarianism - Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol 21, 1992

My notes � Mill�s argument and his appeal to deliberative capacities

recasts Mill�s thought in the light of deliberation, i.e. considering, planning, implementing etc. ???

considers higher pleasures as being those which require greater deliberation of us, i.e. involve our higher deliberative capacities (which are what separates us from animals)

considers liberties in the same light � we have rights in order to protect our deliberative capacities

Brink�s understanding of Mill�s defense of liberty

paternalism is not always impermissible

weak paternalism is defensible

the harm principle is not the sole legitimate ground for restricting liberty

various forms of social welfare legislation are acceptable

there are rights to basic liberties

but no rights to liberty per se

Mill � Utilitarianism, ch 4

Hare � Moral Thinking, ch 9

justice, as morality

2 levels

critical thinking

contingent empirical truths, founded on the world as it is